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Cet article entend décrire et mettre en évidence à la fois les continuités et les changements dans le cas de 
l’inspection scolaire suédoise, avec une attention particulière aux justifications et aux usages de l’inspection 
comprise comme un instrument politique durable et récurrent de gouvernement de l’éducation. Quels rôles et 
fonctions ont été attribués à l’inspection sous toutes ses formes historiques ? À quels moyens et modes de 
fonctionnement a-t-on eu recours ? Comment comprendre à la fois les continuités et les changements qu’ont 
connus les inspections ? L’analyse se fonde sur de la documentation institutionnelle (rapports de commissions, 
projets de loi) ainsi que sur des recherches et des études antérieures. L’approche théorique retenue entend rendre 
compte des dynamiques institutionnelles de changement (ou de reproduction) que connaissent les inspections, 
que ces dynamiques soient drastiques ou incrémentales. Les premières inspections scolaires furent effectuées 
dès les années 1860. Depuis cette date, les inspections ont été assurées par différentes agences régionales et 
nationales et leur objet, leur champ d’application et leur intensité ont différé. L’inspection scolaire fut supprimée 
lors de la mise en œuvre des importantes réformes de décentralisation des années  1990. Mais après un 
enterrement politique d’une dizaine d’années, elle fut réintroduite en 2003. En 2008, une agence à part entière, 
l’« Inspection des écoles » (SI, pour « Schools Inspectorate »), fut même constituée pour pousser plus loin l’effort 
d’inspection. En permettant des changements aussi bien graduels que plus fondamentaux, les inspections 
apparaissent finalement comme des institutions qui s’adaptent rapidement aux différentes attentes et solutions 
mises en avant selon les contextes politiques. Comme l’illustre amplement le cas suédois, l’inspection reste, dans 
son fondement même, une institution qui dure, qui gagne et regagne sans cesse de la légitimité.
Mots-clés (TESE) : inspection, gouvernance, évaluation, politique en matière d’éducation, Suède.
INTRODUCTION 
In general, there is an intense political interest in 
national school inspection, and national inspectorates 
are undergoing rapid change and reform in Europe and 
beyond. The political popularity of the institution is evi-
dent, as inspectorates are restructured, reformed, and 
assigned different, new, or additional missions and aims. 
Despite changes in the international and national policy 
environment towards decreasing the importance of 
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 hierarchical or regulatory instruments of governing—in 
an era when “governance” replaces vertical “govern-
ment” and traditional government is being “reinvented” 
(Pierre & Peters 2000; Rhodes 2007; Osborne & Gaebler 
1992)—, inspectorates seem to have persisted and suc-
cessfully stood the test of time. An often cited expres-
sion is that one never steps in the same river twice (cf. 
Peters & Pierre 2001), but somehow inspection is pre-
sumed to do just that: school inspection is a favoured 
political option deemed efficient and necessary by policy 
makers, irrespective of the “water” flowing in the educa-
tion system and even in society as a whole. 
School inspection has been a long-standing feature in 
governing Swedish education. After the first compulsory 
elementary school system was introduced in 1842, only 
two decades passed before national school inspectors 
were appointed in 1861 to help implement the intentions 
of the reform. For the next 130 years, school inspections 
remained central tools in the political governing of edu-
cation, although the intensity, scope, and institutional 
and organisational forms have varied. In 1991 as a part 
of a significant restructuring including far-reaching decen-
tralisation of Swedish education, a dramatic decision to 
close the national agency Skolöverstyrelsen (SÖ) was 
taken, and school inspection was abolished once the 
new National Agency for Education (NAE) was formed. 
In the new and decentralised system of governing edu-
cation, the national administrative level was supposed 
to keep schools at arm’s length, leaving significant room 
for manoeuvre to the municipalities, now the authorities 
responsible for compulsory education. Initially, school 
inspection in the form of external inspectors engaging in 
scrutiny of individual schools on a regular basis did not 
exist. But things soon changed; school inspection was 
re-established in Sweden after a decade; with politicians 
from both left and right advocating the reintroduction.
On one hand, school inspection has been a permanent 
presence in the Swedish education system for more than 
a century. On the other, the history of Swedish school 
inspection attests both the drastic dismantling of an 
inspection agency and the reintroduction of inspection 
to the system. How can one understand the apparently 
counterintuitive return to a governing tool associated with 
hierarchical and bureaucratic ways of governing in an 
era emphasising, for instance, teacher professionalism, 
local discretion, and autonomy? This national case pro-
vides interesting possibilities for exploring issues of both 
continuity and incremental as well as more rapid change, 
and for illuminating the trajectories of school inspection 
as embedded in national education systems and set-
tings. In this context, needless to say, it is important to 
acknowledge that Swedish education policy develop-
ments are not taking place in isolation. On the contrary, 
the nation-state engages in negotiations and international 
work, and even if this has not necessarily diminished 
national central state power (cf. Goodwin & Grix 2011), 
the national-international interface is central to an under-
standing of the national (Lawn & Grek 2012).
The aim of this paper is to describe and highlight some 
important continuities and changes in the Swedish school 
inspection case, with particular emphasis on the justifi-
cation and use of inspection as an enduring and recur-
ring political instrument to govern education: what roles 
and functions have been assigned to the inspectorate, 
what means of operations have been employed, and how 
can the continuities and changes be understood? The 
primary focus of the paper is recent decades, but a longer 
historical backdrop is also provided as it is necessary for 
understanding later developments.
UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL  
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Institutions play an important role in political and socie-
tal life but are notoriously difficult to define and concep-
tualisations range from narrow definitions to all-encom-
passing ones, including not only formal rules and 
organisations but also informal norms and conventions 
for social interaction (cf. North 1993). In a basic sense, 
however, many definitions agree that institutions are more 
or less enduring entities that do not change instantly or 
very easily (Mahoney 2000). Within the analytical tradi-
tion of historical institutionalism, institutions are seen as 
political legacies from historical struggles (Mahoney 
& Thelen 2010). Here, the concept of path dependency 
roughly denotes that once institutions—such as pro-
grammes, policies, organisations, and agencies—have 
been formed, it is very difficult to alter them, and they 
tend not to deviate from the outlined path. Policy choices 
made earlier influence subsequent ones.
Path dependency can be seen as “a relatively 
entrenched way of unifying, organising, and regulating a 
certain policy field” (Torfing 2001, 286), implying that in 
education, for instance, certain patterns for steering pol-
icy are developed which will influence the shape and 
contents of coming policies. This, in turn, denotes that 
during periods of institutional stability, previous policy 
decisions can serve as good predictors of future ones 
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(Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Peters 1996; Hall & Taylor 1996; 
Pierson 2000; cf. Simola et al. 2013; Helgøy & Homme 
2006). Following this logic, it has been said that the his-
torical-institutional approach is better suited to explain-
ing persistence and continuity than it is to explaining 
change (Peters 1999). However, concepts such as punc-
tuated equilibrium acknowledge that institutions can 
indeed change, often very dramatically—even though 
stability is the prevailing state (Pierson 2000). In this 
paper, I argue that there are reasons to see institutional 
continuity and change as both blurred and intertwined 
and want to highlight both processes of more incremen-
tal as well as more fundamental change.
Some theoretical developments have aimed to account 
for the dynamic relationship that underlies both institu-
tional reproduction and change, also encouraging further 
analysis through concrete cases of different versions of 
such change (Mahoney & Thelen 2010). Thelen (2003, 
213) argues that models of path dependency need to be 
complemented by other tools that enable us to account 
for this relationship, as these processes may be more 
incremental than usually proposed. Change does not 
necessarily need to encompass the whole institution but 
can target and influence parts of it; further, change can 
be the result of exogenous forces as well as of endog-
enous institutional circumstances. Departing from this 
terminology, institutional conversion refers to what hap-
pens when existing frameworks come to be enacted in 
a different way, resulting in institutions’ reorientation 
towards new goals or missions. These shifts can be 
orchestrated from within the institution, and critics can 
use conversion strategies to bring about change. 
Institutional layering involves revisions, additions, and 
modifications when new elements are added to—but do 
not replace—old ones: examples are hiring new person-
nel and implementing new modes or techniques of work-
ing. Each revision may be small, but when placed along-
side one another, they accumulate and result in a 
fundamental change. Displacement refers to changes in 
rules or procedures—for instance, when alternative 
arrangements are rediscovered and put back into use or 
recycled. Such changes can be rapid, similar to the 
notion of punctuated equilibrium, or slow. Institutions 
also face the risk of drift—erosion stemming from an 
incapacity to respond to the external context, as when 
the institution does not respond to environmental 
changes. Another such risk is exhaustion by slow-moving 
breakdown, self-destruction from within (Mahoney 
& Thelen 2010; Thelen 2000, 2003). These change pro-
cesses can also be associated with certain characteris-
tics of the change agents, which could described as for 
instance insurrectionaries, symbionts, subversives or 
opportunists. These change agents operate in a certain 
political context which, of course, strongly influences their 
ability and willingness to act (Mahoney & Thelen 2010).
Our empirical material consists of policy texts, such 
as official government publications, as well as a range 
of secondary sources and scholarly literature. The early 
history of inspection from 1860 onwards is primarily 
explored through secondary materials and research pub-
lications. More recent processes of reintroducing and 
later reinforcing inspection (2001–2003 and 2006–2008, 
respectively) have been scrutinised by collecting all the 
official documents produced in the two formal decision-
making processes, from government directions to set up 
a commission to the final debate and decision in parlia-
ment. This material comprises a total of 34 government 
bills, parliamentary minutes and motions, commission 
reports, and auditory reports. The texts (primary as well 
as secondary sources) have been read in relation to the 
aim of the study by performing a qualitative content anal-
ysis (Bergström & Boréus 2005) of several steps. Initially, 
relevant sections of text were identified by reading the 
material, and the selected sections were tentatively 
grouped according to broad themes (e.g. governing con-
text, changes in formal frameworks, reform waves, 
inspection in action). In the next step, these passages 
were read in detail with regard to illuminating the ways 
that the rules, functions, and operations of the inspec-
torates have been represented over the years in the 
changing political context of which they are a part.
GOVERNING SWEDEN  
AND GOVERNING EDUCATION 
The Social Democratic Party holds a prominent posi-
tion in Swedish political history. This party has domina-
ted the political scene in the past, thus leaving a distinc-
tive mark on national politics and policy. The Social 
Democrats have rarely been out of office; exceptions are 
1976, 1982, 1991, and more recently 2006 and 2010. 
The Social Democratic Party has, of course, also 
influenced education policy to a large extent, traditionally 
focusing on issues such as equivalence, equality and 
education as a means for social cohesion. But even if 
the Social Democrats have constituted a “hegemonic 
force” (Agius 2007, 585), the nonsocialist opposition has 
been active in educational issues and has also initiated 
significant reforms when in office.
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In the wake of extensive decentralisation and deregu-
lation, especially during the 1990s (cf. below), the local 
level (i.e. the 290 municipalities) received and still have 
far-reaching discretion in determining how education is 
to be conducted. The size and organisation of municipal 
administrations vary significantly, not least because the 
municipalities vary greatly in size. Municipalities can freely 
allocate resources and organise teaching and learning 
with the aim of attaining the national goals. Another 
important development concerns the profound marketi-
sation of the Swedish education system, a phenomenon 
that, among other things, has resulted in a rise in what 
are called free schools, i.e. schools that are open for all 
students and free of charge that are not operated by a 
municipality but still tax funded. Even from an interna-
tional perspective, the Swedish education system is 
viewed as extensively affected by marketisation. For 
example, it allows school owners, including risk-capital 
companies, to earn a profit from the still publicly financed 
free schools (Rönnberg 2011). Parallel with and in con-
nection to these developments, the national level of gov-
ernment has increased and intensified its control and 
evaluative activities (cf. Segerholm 2009).
Over the years, school inspections have been carried 
out by different state agencies and from a comparative 
perspective, it is important to note that Swedish agen-
cies often are portrayed as largely autonomous. Formally, 
state agencies are governed by written government 
assignments, but a ministry and its ministers are not 
allowed to intervene in individual matters handled by the 
agency. It is also important to note, however, that an 
agency is subordinate to a ministry and therefore is a 
government organisation and a part of the state’s admin-
istrative apparatus (Pierre 2004). All in all, agencies enjoy 
both discretion and a powerful position in the Swedish 
setting. Coupled with extensive informal contacts with 
the ministry, an agency’s expertise clearly places the cen-
tral agencies in an influential position, and their knowl-
edge is important to the government’s administrative 
efforts (cf. Rothstein 2005). 
IN BRIEF: 130 YEARS OF SCHOOL INSPECTION
This section makes no attempt at a full description of 
school inspection during such a long historical period; 
however, several traits deserve to be highlighted. After 
passing the first compulsory elementary schooling act in 
1842, members of parliament submitted motions about 
appointing inspectors. The Elementary School 
Inspectorate (Folkskoleinspektionen) was established in 
1861. At that time, the church and ultimately the parish 
priest were in charge of elementary schooling. The natio-
nal administration wanted to speed the process of imple-
menting the 1842 Act and to make schooling more 
homogenous across the country—and indeed, to ensure 
that schooling was even taking place at all in the rural 
areas, with inspection a vital tool to accomplish that aim. 
The number of inspectors was however moderate to 
begin with; they were either priests or elementary school 
teachers, and were to personally visit all the elementary 
schools in their districts, to gather information about their 
conditions and needs, and to report to the church admi-
nistration and to the Ministry of Education (Karlsson, 
Westman & Andersson 2007).
From the start, inspectors were quite closely connected 
to the ministry, and both inspectors and ministry staff 
met to discuss urgent affairs. There was also a common 
written framework from 1861 stating in detail how the 
school visits were to be conducted and reported in order 
to ensure that inspectors applied the same standards 
and took comparable actions. From this point on, the 
Inspection agency-ministry relationship and the issue of 
how to conduct and accomplish valid and comparable 
inspections have continued to be key points and dilem-
mas for the Inspectorate to handle. Towards the end of 
the century, the elementary school teachers formed a 
union, protesting against the inspections and in particu-
lar the religious influence via the church and the priests 
in carrying out the inspections. Another issue was how 
the inspections were conducted—for instance, teachers 
objected to the highly standardised, formal, and authori-
tative approach, as well as to the perceived lack of situ-
ational judgements in each local context (Karlsson, 
Westman & Andersson 2007)—issues that would be con-
tinuously debated over the years. In 1918, the state 
agency Skolöverstyrelsen (SÖ) was established and per-
formed the school inspections.
The 1946 School Commission made a distinctive mark 
on Swedish education, and the subsequent 1950 parlia-
mentary decision to allow experiments with a nine-year 
comprehensive school also bore consequences for 
inspection, both regarding how inspection was performed, 
what it looked at and its institutional affiliation. When 
county school boards (Länsskolnämnder) were introduced 
in 1958 as sub-divisions in the SÖ, the formal represen-
tation of the church in school-governing bodies was finally 
terminated. Moreover, this meant that inspectional duties 
fell to these new regional (but still state-led) county school 
boards within the SÖ. It was considered important that 
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the SÖ retained overall responsibility for determining a 
standard for schooling, and inspection remained a nec-
essary feature of the system. The inspectors were sup-
posed to help and to give advice about developing and 
improving local schools. Further, inspections and school 
visits were to be performed by inspectors with back-
grounds or training in education (Lundgren 2011). These 
officials were to spend a great deal of time in schools and 
classrooms; observing only one lesson per class was not 
seen as sufficient. Furthermore, written assignments from 
a full class of pupils were to be examined—not merely a 
sample. But over time, it became evident that such high 
ambitions could not be realised (Thelin 1994). The pro-
cedure of how to conduct inspections and what counts 
as “sufficient evidence” are recurring issues also present 
in the contemporary discussion of and in the Inspectorate. 
Historical legacies of inspection are thus recycled and 
mirrored in later times, pointing to important continuities 
that persist irrespective of the political and institutional 
contexts and circumstances. But still and at the same 
time change is certainly also taking place.
The county school boards within the SÖ were reformed 
and gradually changed during the 30 or so years they 
were in operation, and the role and function of inspec-
tion were adjusted accordingly, emphasising the impor-
tance of acknowledging small and gradual institutional 
change. Once again inspections were relocated institu-
tionally and organisationally, and practices changed and 
were layered into one another. To begin with, the admin-
istrative tasks took precedence for the county school 
board inspectors. A decade or so later, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, ideas of decentralisation had started to 
gain political ground, and this would profoundly affect 
education and inspection. In the 1970s, development 
and improvement issues were high on the educational 
policy agenda. Even so and in contrast, the 1989 bill on 
education governance (Government bill 1989) declared 
that inspection was not to interpret political decisions, 
meaning that the developmental functions of inspection 
were toned down as its more control-oriented, supervi-
sory role was highlighted and compliance with national 
regulations put forward as a central task for inspection. 
Still, national uniformity and educational equivalence 
were seen as core values for inspection to safeguard 
(Committee report 2007)—as had been the case earlier. 
The functions and means of inspection had continually 
changed and new practices were layered into old ones. 
However, the regional boards hardly had time to adjust 
to the new, stricter, and intensified inspections (Lander 
& Granström 2000) before unfolding events would lead 
to their dismantling.
DECENTRALISATION: AGENCIES DISMANTLED
AND INSPECTION ABOLISHED 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several education 
reforms were launched under both Social Democratic 
and nonsocialist governments. Decentralisation, deregu-
lation, and marketisation were guiding principles. In edu-
cation, all employer responsibilities were transferred from 
the state to the municipalities, a new funding system was 
introduced, a system of free school choice was set up; 
at the same time, a new curriculum, grading system, and 
syllabuses were implemented. The reforms were initiated 
by a Social Democratic minority government and inten-
sified and carried out by a nonsocialist minority coalition 
from 1991 to 1994. These developments changed the 
perception about the centre-local relationship in educa-
tion as decentralisation was a very prominent feature of 
the reforms. In fact, from being one of the most centra-
list education systems in the western world, the system 
was significantly restructured resulting in one of the most 
decentralised systems (cf. Dobbins 2014). These far-rea-
ching reforms also had profound implications for the role 
and function of school inspection. 
The Social Democratic government via the Ministry of 
Public Administration had planned to reform the regional 
administration which involved the county school boards 
under the SÖ. This proposal would, however, never be 
implemented, as the minister of education at the time 
(and later prime minister), Göran Persson, had another 
agenda. In a speech Persson gave at the Social 
Democratic Party congress in late 1990, he declared that 
there would be no county school boards and no SÖ: it 
would be terminated altogether, and a new National 
Agency for Education (NAE; in Swedish, Skolverket), was 
to be established instead. This radical decision took many 
by surprise, and the event made Swedish administrative 
history (Hjort 2006). A reform was to be expected, given 
earlier reforms aiming at decentralisation and thus reduc-
ing the influence from the central state and its adminis-
tration, but even in this context, the repercussions for 
the state agencies were remarkable. It was a rapid dis-
placement of an agency that had been around since 
1918, constituting a fundamental break from the previ-
ous path. It could be described as a critical juncture, 
occurring in a political period of “contingency during 
which the usual constraints on action are lifted or eased” 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 7), making Persson’s radical 
move against his own party possible in which a radical 
shift and an abrupt displacement in the form of a sud-
den breakdown of an institution came to profoundly 
change the rules of the game (cf. Mahoney & Thelen 
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2010, 16). The rapid displacement of inspection—in the 
form of the individual scrutiny of public schools on a 
regular basis performed by employed national inspec-
tors—lasted for almost a decade. 
In a way, decentralisation accompanied by increased 
national control via inspection could be viewed as an 
expected development: Reduced central activity, for 
instance due to decentralisation of authority and respon-
sibilities, tends to be accompanied by the introduction 
of processes and mechanisms that increase central con-
trol (Lægreid, Roness & Rubecksen 2008). But initially 
the Swedish case took quite a different path: In the wake 
of the extensive decentralisation reforms and the new 
system of governing education, Swedish policy makers, 
via Göran Persson, abolished inspection and made dra-
matic changes in the role and function of national agen-
cies. National arm’s-length support and advice and an 
overall soft approach were preferred. The dramatic clos-
ing of the SÖ was an “exogenous shock” that imposed 
a new interpretive frame from the outside and did not 
originate within the agency (Mahoney & Thelen 2010). 
Looking at the change agent Göran Persson, he can be 
described as an insurrectionary, an actor that actively 
tries to eliminate existing institutions by mobilising 
against them—a behaviour associated with displacement, 
often in its rapid form of overturn during a critical junc-
ture period (Mahoney & Thelen 2010, 25). But what insti-
tutional arrangements followed from this rapid 
displacement?
SETTING UP A NEW AGENCY SUITED FOR A 
DECENTRALISED EDUCATION SYSTEM
When the SÖ was abolished after more than 70 years 
in operation, its former staff was not automatically 
employed by the new National Agency for Education 
(NAE); new personnel were hired. The drastic decision 
to dismantle the state agency and its local boards also 
had a symbolic function: it was important to signal a 
decisive break from the former SÖ, traditionally regarded 
as representing the bureaucratic and inefficient state 
governing that the decentralist and deregulatory reforms 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s had been meant to 
resolve. After terminating rather than reforming the cur-
rent state educational administration, the NAE was set 
up in 1991 as a completely new agency purportedly bet-
ter suited to the new and decentralised system of stee-
ring Swedish education. Detailed state regulation was 
replaced with a strategy of governing by objectives. The 
NAE’s role was to support and promote local develop-
ment from a distance—to act as a partner with expertise 
supporting municipalities in their own efforts to develop 
schools and education in their geographical areas. Thus, 
there were no reasons to supervise compliance with 
national regulations via school inspections; rather, the 
professionals in schools and municipalities were sup-
posed to acquire and use the knowledge best suited to 
improve their schools, adjusting it to fit local needs (cf. 
Haldén 1997; Jacobsson & Sahlin-Andersson 1995).
In short, the NAE was to have an arm’s-length relation-
ship with schools and to “halt at the municipal border” 
(Statskontoret 2005). As a result, the NAE did not exam-
ine individual schools or conduct any supervision of 
schools and municipalities in the form of inspections, 
with one exception: the NAE still scrutinised the newly 
established (and at that time, very few) independent free 
schools. The NAE also investigated formal complaints 
concerning individual schools or municipalities, but such 
investigations were few and did not take the form of 
inspections. This meant that overall, the municipalities 
were trusted to inspect the schools under their authority 
as they saw fit, and no legislation or ordinances stated 
how they should perform their inspection duties, along 
the lines of the decentralist policy rhetoric that dominated 
the political scene. There is not much research about 
how the municipalities actually carried out this task (cf. 
Lander & Granström 2000), but there are good reasons 
to believe that methods varied a great deal and that, for 
instance, small municipalities in rural areas had very lim-
ited capacity to perform such tasks. The Social Democrats 
were defeated in the 1991 elections, but the new non-
socialist coalition broadly continued to reform education 
along the lines the previous government had followed. 
There was overall agreement about the decentralist direc-
tion, as well as regarding the need for increased parental 
choice and allowing education professionals more dis-
cretion. However, it was not long before political voices 
from both left and right were raised about the need for 
stronger national supervision of schools and municipali-
ties via the NAE. In the early 1990s the Christian 
Democrats, a part of the government coalition in office, 
and the Social Democrats, now in opposition, both sub-
mitted parliamentary motions exhorting the government 
to ensure a more active role for the NAE in evaluating 
and supervising the educational system (Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Education 1994).
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AND INSPECTION REEMERGES…
In 1994 the Social Democrats were back in office, and 
their annual written assignments to the NAE over the next 
several years repeatedly urged the agency to exercise 
more active and direct control, including placing a stron-
ger emphasis on inspecting for compliance with national 
regulations. But this did not really happen: the agency 
had been founded on other principles, and these requests 
did not fit well with the advisory and dialogue-oriented 
path the agency initially had been commissioned to take 
(National Audit Office 2001). But the political authorities 
persisted, insisting on greater national control in educa-
tion, arguing for the use of the national agency to that 
end. In 1998 systematic quality reviews targeting muni-
cipal education authorities were performed by the NAE 
on a regular cycle. At the same time, the nonsocialists 
in political opposition brought forward a demand for a 
new quality-auditing agency to exercise the same type 
of control. In 2002, the Social Democratic government 
presented an educational development plan which sta-
ted that individual school inspections were to be given 
precedence by a reformed NAE (Government develop-
ment plan 2002). In 2003, the inspectorate was rebuilt, 
the NAE was divided into two agencies, and individual 
inspections were prioritised tasks in the reformed NAE. 
The other agency, the National Agency for School 
Improvement, would focus on development and support, 
while the NAE would deal with the more control and com-
pliance oriented issues. 
After more than 10 years without national inspections, 
public schools were now individually visited and 
inspected by the Swedish state via the NAE. Education 
was examined at both the municipal and the individual 
school level, focusing on quality and legal issues, follow-
ing a six-year cycle targeting the whole school system. 
The problem being targeted by inspection was framed 
mainly in terms of safeguarding quality and upholding 
national equivalence, and political unity emerged around 
this way of framing the problem towards which inspec-
tion was directed. The revived inspections had arisen 
from a perceived political need to reinforce national con-
trol, expressed as the need for greater visibility and clar-
ity regarding the role of the state in a system governed 
by objectives and results. The national policy makers 
argued that the municipal responsibility for quality 
improvement and evaluation had not worked out as 
intended after the extensive decentralisation reforms and 
that school results were not improving enough. Inspection 
was supposed to bring about improvement and also 
become a tool for collecting valid information (Government 
development plan 2002; Parliamentary Auditors 2001; 
cf. Rönnberg 2012). Governing by objectives and results, 
regarding the latter for instance by means of inspection, 
became the main strategy forward and by including the 
ex-post oriented element of controlling results, inspec-
tion was rhetorically possible to realign and co-exist with 
a still decentralist overall policy direction—layering it 
alongside the previous “arms-length” element and man-
agement by objectives.
It was clear that the NAE was gradually being redi-
rected to new and reinvented aims, and how such grad-
ual layering eventually, then, coincided with and culmi-
nated in a route taken earlier: that of inspection as a 
means of governing education. The process leading up 
to abolishing the SÖ in the 1990s was discussed and 
debated afterwards, and as Mahoney and Thelen note 
when institutions represent “still contested settlements 
based on specific coalitional dynamics, they are always 
vulnerable to shifts” (2010, 8). The non-inspection direc-
tion turned out to be an unstable one and after abolish-
ing inspection, political forces wanted to turn the new 
NAE back to a more control-oriented route, but initially 
such attempts were not compatible with the internal and 
overall ideology of the new institution. But then gradu-
ally and in the end contrary to the original intentions, the 
reformed NAE arguably started to look more like the ter-
minated SÖ in terms of its number of staff, ways of func-
tioning and organising, and representing the national 
administration in governing education as a strong and 
present force (Nytell 2006). This gradual displacement 
later paved the way for the resurrection of inspections in 
2003—by the very same Social Democrats that were 
responsible for their previous abolishment. By reintro-
ducing inspection, the “non-inspection path” was effec-
tively but gradually punctuated and rather seems to be 
a historical parenthesis in the long life of national school 
inspection.
…AND INSPECTION INTENSIFIES
In 2006, the nonsocialists returned to office; that year 
the Conservative, Liberal, Centre, and Christian 
Democratic Parties banded together and won the natio-
nal elections under the umbrella of the Alliance for 
Sweden. As part of its far-reaching education-reform 
agenda, the new government announced that it intended 
to intensify school-inspection efforts. The inspection 
cycle was to be shorter, and overall more resources 
would be devoted (Alliance for Sweden 2006). The 
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 questions of who should be conducting the reinforced 
inspections and whether the existing institutional fra-
mework was suited to that task were issues the govern-
ment attended to after about six months in office. By 
then, the minister of education from the Liberal Party 
formed two commissions that prepared the next steps 
and paved the way for a new Inspection agency 
(Committee report 2007). The Swedish Schools 
Inspectorate (SI) opened its gates in October 2008.
The new agency had a deliberate aim to hire Inspectors 
with more diverse professional backgrounds, such as 
people with legal training or general social science ana-
lytical skills. Unlike to the closing of the SÖ, the former 
NAE Inspectors were not fired when the new agency was 
formed, they kept their jobs and were transferred to the 
new SI but their new colleagues came with other than 
educational backgrounds. Such layering when new ele-
ments are combined with old ones is of importance as 
inspection is inevitably an embodied activity; it is per-
formed by inspectors, and their views and backgrounds 
influence inspection practices (cf. Lindgren 2013). The 
history of Swedish school inspection shows that the 
recruitment of inspectors is an important step when build-
ing and changing an institution, whether these officials 
were priests or teachers or, as today, individuals trained 
in law, the social sciences, or education. 
Under the nonsocialist government post 2006, the core 
values of educational equivalence and quality were still 
held high, as they had been in earlier times and in the 
Social Democratic period. However, another concept was 
gaining ground in terms of pupils’ academic achieve-
ments (Government Commission direction 2007; 
Committee report 2007). Other justifications were also 
reiterated that were also present in the discussions lead-
ing up to the 2003 reintroduction: inspection was needed 
to boost local evaluation efforts and to control and assess 
local developmental work, inspection would provide 
needed data, and the comparability of reports was to be 
improved (cf. Rönnberg 2012). Going back to the notion 
of equivalence, it has been a central and an uncontested 
part of Swedish education. It was brought forward as an 
essential value that an inspectorate must safeguard 
already when the first inspectorate was established more 
than a hundred years earlier, and it continued to hold a 
prominent position in the more recent developments 
when inspection was resurrected and intensified. The 
concept of equivalence is a fundamental one in the 
Swedish education policy context but it has changed its 
meanings, especially since the centralising and compre-
hensive reforms of the 1960s. Today, and after the exten-
sive decentralisation and marketisation/privatisation 
reforms of the 1990s in particular, the concept is increas-
ingly linked to individual rights, outcomes and choice, 
rather than to the unifying social-justice dimension it once 
incorporated. Additional connotations and functions are 
thus being layered on to the concept, and these too have 
left their marks on the scope and function of inspection, 
mirrored in the goals and missions assigned to the 
inspectorate: a core persists while other renegotiated 
meanings are added to it, a sign of institutional layering 
and of how new and old elements can exist side by side 
within an institution, suggesting a gradual but important 
change.
In the process leading to its reintroduction in 2003, 
inspection was not discussed with much reference to 
other nations or systems. In the process resulting in inten-
sified inspection and the establishment of a new agency, 
however, some external input was explicitly mentioned 
(Committee report 2007). External input to the Swedish 
inspection system suggested, for instance, introducing 
unannounced school visits and proportionate inspection 
based on previous inspection history—methods which 
were not used in the original NAE inspections (Segerholm, 
2012). After the SI was formed, international influences 
however became more pronounced, and international 
collaboration and exchange are targeting or influencing 
parts of the way inspection is conducted. And also, 
importantly enough, serve as a way of legitimising a cer-
tain modes of operation, etc. (cf. Grek et al. 2013). But 
overall, the international influences do not come across 
as particularly strong forces and initiators of change, and 
national needs and comparisons, for instance, with other 
domestic policy areas, such as higher education and 
social welfare, are articulated by policy makers, while 
international input does not appear to receive the same 
interest or explicit attention as a motive for reintroducing 
inspection.
2008 AND ONWARDS: CONTINUING AND 
GRADUAL CHANGE…
Since 2008, the inspectorate has been given more 
tasks, and political belief in inspection does not seem to 
have lost ground—quite the contrary. The SI appears to 
be a prominent political problem solver; it is supposed 
to address diverse urgent problems in education, such 
as the way national tests are handled: the inspectorate 
is now responsible for evaluating teachers’ assessments 
of national tests (“assessing the assessment”). Another 
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area in which the SI has been assigned a prominent role 
is with regard to the independent but tax funded free 
schools. A government commission covering most but 
not all political parties advocated greater and stricter 
control in and of the free-school sector by the SI as a 
way of resolving the problems that profit making and 
school closure and sales have caused (Committee report 
2013). Still another area is individual complaints filed by 
stakeholders; the number has increased dramatically, and 
the SI is responsible for investigating them. These 
examples all point to a central feature of inspection as a 
political instrument: it can be used to resolve a wide 
range of perceived political problems and can perform 
quite different activities. Through such amendments and 
revisions, the Inspectorate’s original aims are renegotia-
ted and ultimately changed, albeit not in a way that com-
pletely alters the function of the institution. Rather, new 
and additional tasks are being layered into and placed 
alongside the original mission and rules. All in all, this 
points to the importance of not only drastic but also 
incremental institutional change.
Looking back over the years, an important example 
illustrating these continuous conversions is how to bal-
ance control and development efforts: Is the inspector-
ate ultimately aiming to provide improvement, support, 
and feedback, or does it represent the more standard-
ised and non-context-sensitive control and supervision 
of compliance with formal regulations? As previously 
shown, this dilemma was evident quite early on, when 
the teachers’ union protested that inspection was too 
standardised, formal, and authoritative; it also arose later, 
when the SÖ and Länsskolnämnderna were directed to 
both more improvement and more control-oriented efforts 
during different time periods. The more recent develop-
ments also show signs of institutional conversion. The 
improvement-oriented approach in the 2003 inspections 
performed by the NAE was converted in the new SI start-
ing in 2008 to explicitly target formal regulations, to be 
standardised in a single format for all compulsory 
schools, and to directly address pupils’ educational 
achievements. By assigning new and more tasks to the 
SI after 2008, politicians have further redirected the 
inspectorate to other missions and aims, such as safe-
guarding an education system that school choice and 
the explosive increase of free schools have put under 
political pressure and stress. Through such gradual con-
versions, the inspectorate becomes an adaptable and 
useful tool to suit almost any political circumstance.
… RESULTING IN AN ADAPTABLE 
AND ENDURING POLITICAL TOOL 
The Swedish school inspection case thus illustrates 
how inspection can be seen as a supple and adaptable 
tool of government, inevitably political in nature (cf. 
Lascoumes & Le Galès 2007). The inspection tool encom-
passes a range of activities that can take the form of both 
“carrots, sticks and sermons” (Vedung 1998), and ins-
pection can be simultaneously directed towards, for ins-
tance, legal issues or sanctions and towards economic 
incentives or means of resource distribution. But it can 
also at the same time contain more subtle means of 
governing, such as the promotion of self-evaluation, the 
transfer of knowledge, and the encouragement of coor-
dination. These activities may be direct (e.g. regulatory 
sanctions, fiscal instruments) or indirect means of stee-
ring, the latter implying a less visible—but notably, not 
less important—role for the state. Through both radical 
and gradual change processes, the inspection tool is 
continually moulded and bended to suit changing cir-
cumstances, fending off the risks of permanent institu-
tional drift or exhaustion.
Inspectorates provide a sense of reassurance about 
the system and function as universal education policy 
problem solvers, connected to issues of legitimation at 
the political level (cf. Ozga 2013). The historical develop-
ment of the Swedish Inspectorate thereby illustrates that 
school-inspection institutions seem to be readily adapt-
able to fit different expectations and solutions and school 
inspection has remained, at its core, an institution that 
manages to gain and regain legitimacy. If governing activ-
ities are regulative, inquisitive, and meditative (Jacobsson 
2006), school-inspection institutions appear able to man-
age activities of all these types. But they do it with dif-
ferent stress and emphasis, and the inspectorate’s tool-
boxes in their different incarnations contain interesting 
mixes of these activities. At certain historical times the 
regulative aspects are prominent, and at other times they 
are played down; consider the relation between control 
and development efforts.
In this paper, this flexibility in setting up the operations 
of an inspection system is argued to be a key to under-
standing its endurance: inspection responds readily to 
changing political demands by adapting and employing 
different roles at different times, by gradual as well as 
more drastic processes of change. Owing to their capac-
ity to encompass both more regulative and more sup-
portive and less coercive means of regulation—albeit still 
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connected under the inspection umbrella—inspections 
become adaptable and favoured as politically conveni-
ent solutions. Looking further into the gradual, incremen-
tal as well as more drastic change processes highlight 
the ways in which Inspectorates continue to be vital and 
enduring political tools of educational governing. School-
inspection institutions are perhaps so enduring that it 
seems hard to ever get them to disappear, as the Swedish 
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